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“While engagement with non-state armed groups will not always 
result in improved protection, the absence of systematic engagement 
will almost certainly mean more, not fewer, 
civilian casualties in current conflicts.” 




The Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) indicates that “We the peoples of the 
United Nations determined […] to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person […]”, as well as “to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained”.1 
The respect and protection of fundamental human rights is the key element in 
peacekeeping and peace-building between nations in the world. However, today one of the 
most biggest and serious threats to the international peace and security are the violations of 
human rights during armed conflicts that arise not among States, but among warring factions, 
such as armed non-state actors (ANSA’s). The violence caused by these armed non-state 
actors leads to massive violations of human rights, such as: conflict-related deaths, 
displacement and devastation, threats to physical, sexual integrity and family life, torture, 
forced disappearance, the destruction of schools, hospitals and many more. For this purpose, 
the protection of fundamental human rights is significant in both – international and national 
level. 
Armed non-state actors are active in most armed conflicts today and are responsible for 
many violations of International Human Rights Law (HRL) and International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL). Armed groups can either protect or harm civilians by their actions. Although, 
ANSA’s have obligations under customary international law to respect and protect civilians2 
                                                          
1
 Charter of the United Nations (1945), paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble 
2
 Armed groups and the protection of civilians, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/policy-studies/ongoing/armed-
non-state-actors-and-protection-of-civilians [accessed 12 August 2014] 
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and can play a positive role in promoting civilian protection, not all ANSA’s agree to obey to 
international norms and standards, as well as act in good faith regarding their commitments. 
Take the latter-day situation in Ukraine. Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence are violated by Russia.
3
 Russian armed forces are engaged in direct military 
operations in Ukraine and the State continues to supply weapons to ANSA’s, known as the 
Donetsk separatists, in eastern Ukraine.
4
 There is no doubt that these actions of Russia 
undermine the stability and security of Ukraine and causes a lot of serious violations of 
various International Law norms.
5
 However, there is also no doubt that not only Russia can be 
blamed for the unstable and dangerous situation in Ukraine.
6
  
Pro-Russian Donetsk separatists should also be treated as responsible for the destruction 
of social and political system of Ukraine. They are responsible for hundreds of civilian 
casualties and violations of fundamental human rights as well. There are a lot of articles of 
other scholars about the responsibility and obligations of ANSA’s under IHL, particularly 
under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) and 
Additional Protocol II (AP II), in such situations.
7
 It is admitted that customary law provisions 
of Common Article 3, as well as the principles of distinction and proportionality, and the 
prohibition of perfidy or precaution in attack are also part of customary international law 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts and are then also applicable to the armed  
non-state groups.
8
 However, the direct applicability of HRL norms to ANSA’s among scholars 
remains controversial.  
                                                          
3
 Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, Press Release (2014) 124, Issued on 4 Sep. 2014, 




 The Russian Federation bears significant responsibility for the violence and instability in south-eastern Ukraine, 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-russian-federation-bears-significant-responsibility-for-the-
violence-and-instability-in-south-eastern-ukraine [accessed 24 August 2014]; 
Ukraine must 'stop war on own people', http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-27017743 [accessed 24 August 
2014] 
6
 Russian troops removing ID markings 'gross violation', http://www.theguardian.com/news/defence-and-
security-blog/2014/mar/06/ukraine-gross-violation-russian-troops  [accessed 24 August 2014] 
7
 For example: Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen “International law and armed non-state 
actors in Afghanistan”, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 93 / Number 881 / March 2011,  
pp. 47-79; Andrew Clapham “Human rights obligations of non-  Situations”, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88 / Issue 863 / September 2006, pp. 491 - 523 
8
 Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen “International law and armed non-state actors in 
Afghanistan”, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 93 / Number 881 / March 2011, pp. 47-79, p.62 
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International human rights law is designed to promote and protect human rights at the 
international, regional and domestic levels. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
released on 10 December 1948, is generally agreed to be the foundation of Human Rights 
Law. This document represents the universal recognition that basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms are inherent to all human beings, inalienable and equally applicable to everyone, and 
that everyone is born free and equal in dignity and rights. Moreover, HRL lays down 
obligations that States, international organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, 
individuals and non-state actors (also ANSA’s) are bound to respect.9 On the one hand, as a 
form of international law, International Human Rights Law is primarily made up of treaties 
between States intended to have binding legal effect between the parties that have agreed to 
them, and, on the other, customary international law rules that are derived from the consistent 
conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way.
10
 In 
addition to this, being a party to the international human rights treaties rises three main duties: 
to respect, to protect and to fulfil fundamental human rights.  The obligation to respect means 
that States must refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of human rights.
11
 The obligation 
to protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses.
12
 The 
obligation to fulfil means that States must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights
13
 (especially the right to life, health, freedom of speech, freedom of 
movement, education). Therefore, through ratification of the international human rights 
treaties, States make sure that their legislation is compatible with their treaty duties and 
obligations. However, when domestic legal proceedings fail to address human rights abuses, 
States are held responsible for failure to protect fundamental human rights and are bound by 
HRL to change the existing situation and act in good faith regarding their treaty commitments. 
                                                          
9
 The foundation of International Human Rights Law, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml 
[accessed 24 August 2014] 
10
 International Human Rights Law, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx 
[accessed 24 August 2014] 
11
 The foundation of International Human Rights Law , http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml 
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What regards non-state actors (NSA’s), especially ANSA’s, their legal status concerning 
the direct obligations and responsibility under HRL is vague. Some scholars
14
 indicate that 
HRL cannot be applicable to the non-state actors, for several reasons. Firstly, HRL regulates 
the behavior of the States and not of private actors. Secondly, there are only few international 
human rights treaties that explicitly mention duties that ANSA’s might be bound by.15 
Though, the situation is evolving and now it is admitted that not only IHL, but also HRL is 
important in order to promote compliance with international law norms by ANSA’s. 
Nowadays, non-state actors play an important role in the protection and development of the 
fundamental human rights and share this power with the States (or international 
organizations).  For this purpose, the main focus of this master thesis is on the possibility to 
apply Human Rights Law norms to NSA’s (including ANSA’s) through the participatory 
rights in the law-making in the international legal system, as well as through the States parties 
of particular human rights treaties. 
Considering the limitations on the length of this master thesis, I will not discuss the 
problems of defining non-state actors, the obligations of non-state actors under international 
customary law, as well as the responsibility of non-state actors under IHL as a comparison to 
the responsibility under HRL. Moreover, the term "non-state actor" refers to all actors 
operating at national or transnational level, such as: individuals, armed groups (including 
insurrectional movements) and other organized entities. In addition, the main questions of this 
thesis are: whether human rights obligations can be applicable to the non-state actors through 
the international human rights treaties that are ratified by the States, and how to apply these 
human rights obligations that has the State to the non-state actors that are acting in the State’s 
territory. 
The structure of master thesis which seeks to explore the issue of applicability of HRL 
obligations to the non-state actors is consequent. As to the first chapter, it discusses the 
problem of defining legal status of the non-state actors in the International Law. International 
law no longer regulates the rights and obligations only of the States. The non-state actors also 
play an important role in the international relationship nowadays. International legal 
personality is all about the ability to have rights and obligations under International Law. 
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 For example: Liesbeth Zegveld “The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law”, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002 
15
 Ibidem  
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However, the non-state actors are neither States nor state-empowered bodies. Therefore, 
Chapter I analyses the ability of the non-state actors to have direct rights and obligations on 
their own, as well as their status in the international legal system on the whole. In order to 
make such analysis, various conceptions of international legal personality will be presented 
and the influence on the status of NSA’s that those conceptions have will be discussed.    
Chapter II considers the possibility of application of HRL obligations to the non-state 
actors. Today, NSA’s are recognized to be a part of International Law. In other words, 
International Law no longer is state-centric. Yet the question of the role of the non-state actors 
in the creation of the International Law norms and standards remains highly controversial. 
There exists a problem of participation of the non-state actors during the creation of 
international duties to them. International obligations to NSA’s are composed by the States 
and usually without consent of the NSA’s. For this reason, Chapter II is divided into several 
sets of questions, regarding, firstly, the creation of rights and obligations to the non-state 
actors and their possible role in creating International Law norms from where their 
international obligations rise, and secondly, the obligations of NSA’s under HRL that rises 
from HRL norms and from the legitimate expectations of the international community on the 
whole. 
Chapter III will consider the issue of the direct responsibility of the non-state actors for 
human rights violations and the possibility to apply the responsibility to the non-state actors 
under HRL through the State’s obligations under HRL. 
This master thesis will use social science methodology to answer and discus the 
questions stated above. There are logical and systematic method used for summation and 
conclusions. For given examples and analysis is used periphrastic method is used. Besides 
that, teleological and comparative methods are also used. The main sources of this master 
thesis are law publications, international treaties, conventions, United Nations documents and 
the general comments of Human Rights bodies. The example of Donetsk separatists, acting in 
the eastern Ukraine, is used to illustrate what influence ANSA’s have on the protection and at 
the same time on the violations of fundamental human rights, and the reluctance of the States 





1. Chapter I: International legal personality of the non-state actors 
 
1.1. Conceptions of International legal personality and their impact of the international 
status of the non-state actors: 
 
International legal personality (ILP) is a controversial notion of the International Law. 
As Roland Portmann indicates, personality in the International Law “[…] tends to be a 
relatively philosophical and at times abstract topic”. The author also indicates that the 
concept of ILP is “[…] closely related to the nature and purpose of international law in 
general”.16 Indeed, there is no clearly established international law of persons. That is, legal 
personality is the status which enables an entity to function in a legal order
17
 - to have certain 
rights and duties under the International Law, as well as to be able to invoke international 
responsibility and to be held internationally responsible. However, there are different positions 
among scholars and international lawyers on exactly which entities count as persons in the 
International Law, as well as under what criteria personality is acquired and what specific 
consequences this status entails. 
Furthermore, there are different opinions on what international legal personality is and 
what the subjects of the International Law are. For this purpose, the different approach to the 
concept of legal personality may have a big influence whether NSA’s are (or should be) 
recognized as a subject of the International Law, as well as having ILP. There can be several 
positions on the subjects of the International Law distinguished
18
: 
1. States-only: this position indicates that only States have international personality; 
2. Recognition: the second position recognizes that other entities can also purchase 
international legal personality; 
3. Individualistic: this position states that individuals may also be subjects of the 
International Law; 
4. Formal: the fourth position declares the International Law as an open system; 
                                                          
16
 Roland Portmann “Legal Personality in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.10 
17
 Janne E. Nijman “Non-State Actors and the International Rule of Law: Revisiting the “Realist Theory” of 
International Legal Personality” in “Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law. From Law-Takers to  
Law-Makers”, ed. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, Ashgate, Farnham, 2010, pp. 91-124, p. 93 
18
 Roland Portmann “Legal Personality in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 13-18 
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5. Actor: the fifth position stipulates a presumption that all effective actors of 
international relations are relevant for the international legal system. 
1.1. Under States-only conception NSA’s are seemed as not directly relevant for the 
International Law.
19
 In other words, the International Law is coherent as a relationship only 
between the States. It is the traditional subject doctrine which is criticized nowadays. The view 
that the international community consists only of the States and that only the States have 
international rights under the International Law and can be bound by this law is incorrect.
20
 
The importance of the role of NSA’s in the international plane is rising.21 Indeed, more and 
more scholars
22
 admit that the recognition of NSA’s as having ILP is significant in 
development of and compliance with the International Law norms today. 
2.2. Although this position indicates that States are still the original international legal 
persons of the International Law, it also acknowledges that other entities can have certain 
international rights and duties analogous to those of States, if those entities are recognized by 
those States.
23
 This is usually how the new States gain international rights and duties, as well 
as the status of ILP. This also means that by this kind of procedure the States can alike 
recognize NSA’s. Though, Roland Portmann indicates that in order for the non-state actors to 
gain the status of international subject (as well as the possibility to bear international rights 
and obligations) there must be a recognition none the less of two States, because there is a 
presumption that NSA’s “[…] naturally belong to the municipal, and not to the international, 
legal order” and, therefore, “[…] the act of recognition as an international person has to be 
in more unequivocal terms than is the case with the recognition of states”.24 The recognition 
may be explicit or by clear implication. Thus, at the same time, the recognition of the non-
state actors is seen controversial by the States. For this reason, the possibility to require NSA’s 
                                                          
19
 Ibidem, p. 13-18 
20
 Ibidem, p. 13-18 
21
 The role of Non-State Actors in International Relations, http://www.academia.edu/5124220/The_Role_of_ 
Non-state_Actors_in_International_Relations [accessed 24 August 2014] 
22
 For example, Andrea Bianchi “The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State Actors and International Law” in “From 
Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma”, Ulrich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, 
Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Andreas Paulus, Sabine von Schorlemer, and Christoph Vedder, 2011, pp. 1-21; 
Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen “International law and armed non-state actors in 
Afghanistan”, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 93 / Number 881 / March 2011, pp. 47-79 
23
 Roland Portmann “Legal Personality in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.80 
24
 Ibidem, p. 82 
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to obey international rules and standards, and to find them responsible for the breaches of the 
international norms is aggravated.
25
 
3.3. The third position states a presumption that States and various other entities can be 
international persons, if there are international norms addressing them.
26
 Nowadays it is 
admitted that the individuals as the States and the international organizations should be treated 
as the subjects of the International Law and as having the ILP.
27
 Moreover, individuals are 
held internationally responsible for the violations of the fundamental international norms no 
matter, if they were acting as the agent of the State or as a private actor. What regards NSA’s, 
there could also be a possibility to apply this conception from the perspective that NSA’s too 
consists of individuals (groups of individuals).
28
 That is, individuals as the members of the 
NSA’s could be held responsible for the violations of the international rules. This is possible 
under the International Criminal Law (ICL). However, it would be hard to use this 
individualistic conception concerning HRL, because there is no international recognition that 
NSA’s have certain rights and duties under HRL, and now to lean only to the presumption that 
the members of NSA’s are also individuals would be too vague, therefore this question will be 
discussed wider in the next chapter. 
      4.4. This conception indicates that every entity may be an international person.
29
 
That is, the international legal system is being seen as open to everyone and that the creation 
and development of the international norms do not rest on having a status of international legal 
personality.
30
 International legal person is a person to whom international legal system has 
vested rights, obligations and responsibilities
31
, in other words – personality is not a 
precondition, but the consequence of ability to possess international rights and duties. 
Therefore, there can be made a presumption that NSA’s can also be treated as having ILP, 
because they do have certain obligations and responsibilities under International Law (e.g. it is 
recognized that NSA’s, especially ANSA’s, can be held responsible for the violations of the 
                                                          
25
 The estimation of the author of the Master Thesis 
26
 Roland Portmann “Legal Personality in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 126 
27
 Ibidem, p. 13-18 
28
 The estimation of the author of the Master Thesis 
29
 Roland Portmann “Legal Personality in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 173 
30
 Ibidem, p. 13-18 
31 Hans Kelsen “General Theory of Law and State”, Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 99 
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fundamental international humanitarian norms under IHL and ICL). This conception will also 
be discussed broader latter on concerning the rights and obligations of the NSA’s under HRL. 
5.5. According to this (Actor) conception, international legal persons are those who have 
factual power in decision-making process during which certain rights and duties rises to these 
persons.
32
 This means that decision-making process determines international rights and 
obligations of those, who participate in that process. For this purpose, the actor conception 
suggests that the phrases “actor” or “participant” should be used instead of “ILP”, because all 
those who participate in the development of international legal system are international 
persons.
33
 Therefore, now the question rises, whether NSA’s are the law-makers or more the 
law-takers? Traditionally international legal system do not include (neither theoretically nor 
conceptually) NSA’s in its law-making procedures.34 However, it can also not be denied that 
NSA’s have a great influence on international decision-making – the acts and solutions of the 
non-state actors have the impact on the State’s policy and practice, as well as on the safety of 
civilians and on the maintenance of international peace on the whole.
35
 Thus, NSA’s could (in 
principle) be treated as participants (subject) of international law, just in a “lower” sense, i.e. 
NSA’s could be considered as participants of the International Law that have the influence not 
on the law-making procedure, but in the law-making process and, at the same time, as having 
certain international rights, duties and responsibilities.
36
  
To review what has been mentioned above, there are various opinions and, at the same 
time, modifications of these presented conception in the international legal reasoning. These 
conceptions have developed through the history, but they are relevant today as well. By 
analyzing five different positions on ILP, it can be seen, how the status and the importance of 
NSA’s has changed. It follows that ILP of the NSA’s, nowadays, should be understood 
according to Individualistic and Formal conceptions, because these positions present and 
suggest wider interpretation of the status of the NSA’s as subjects in the international legal 
                                                          
32
 Roland Portmann “Legal Personality in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 14 
33
 Ibidem, p. 13-18 
34
 Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert “Non-State Actors: Law-Takers or Law-Makers? Is That the Question?” 
in “Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law. From Law-Takers to Law-Makers”, ed. Math Noortmann 
and Cedric Ryngaert, Ashgate, Farnham, 2010, pp. 194-202, p. 198 
35
 The estimation of the author of the Master Thesis 
36





 However, the state-centric view still prevails and this view still aggravates the 
possibility for the NSA’s to participate fully in the international legal plane as the subjects of 
the International Law and, again, aggravates the possibility to impose direct obligations and 
responsibility under HRL on them.  
 
1.2. The status of the non-state actors in the International Law:  
 
As it can be seen from the previous section, there are no clear criteria under which ILP 
and the status of the NSA’s as subjects of the International Law could be determined. 
Furthermore, under the traditional subject doctrine, which still prevails in the international 
legal reasoning, the International Law is based on the rules made by the States for the States 
and that only the States have ILP as they are the bearers of the international rights and 
obligations, as well as they have international law-making and law enforcement powers.
38
 
In fact, International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case (Reparation for Injuries Opinion) 
indicated that being an international legal person “It does not even imply that all its rights and 
duties must be upon the international plane, any more than all the rights and duties of a State 
must be upon that plane. What it does mean is that it is a subject of international law and 
capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its 
rights by bringing international claims”.39 In other words, International legal personality 
includes the capacity to enforce one’s own rights and to compel other subjects to perform their 
duties under the International Law. Therefore, it can be said that a subject of the International 
Law should be able to
40
: 
1. Bring claims before international and national courts and tribunals to enforce 
their rights; 
2. Have the ability or power to come into agreements that are binding under the 
International Law; 
                                                          
37
 The estimation of the author of the Master Thesis 
38
 Philip Alston “Non-State Actors and Human Rights”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 70 
39
 Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, ICJ, 1949 
40
 Ruwanthika Gunaratne “Who is a Subject of International Law”, http://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/ 
2011/03/26/1-2-an-introduction-to-subjects-of-international-law/ [accessed 12 August 2014] 
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3. Enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts; 
4. Be subject to obligations under the International Law. 
However, the definition of ILP given by the ICJ in its Reparation for Injuries Opinion is rather 
uncertain. That is, the Court does not clearly indicate which entities actually are (or should be 
considered as) international legal persons and also the Court does not mention any specific 
criteria under which the status of the entity as a subject of the International Law would be 
apparent.
41
 Still, the given definition of ILP indicates that ILP is being created by the 
international legal system when this system addresses the entity through an international norm 
and standards which, as a result, creates rights, obligations and certain responsibility to that 
entity.
42
 In the same vein, this also means that there is a possibility to include NSA’s as the 
subjects of the International Law, if international situation so requires (“[…] subjects […] 
nature depends upon the needs of the community”43).  
Indeed, the ICJ has widened the scope of the traditional theory of subjects.
44
 That is, the 
ICJ in Reparation for Injuries Opinion has noted that: “The subjects of law in any legal system 
are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature 
depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of 
international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the 
progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of 
action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States”.45 Indeed, the 
subjects of the International Law do not all have the same rights, duties and capacities. For this 
purpose, non-state actors, like the States, individuals, international organizations and etc., 
could in principle be regarded as a subject of the International Law that possibly have certain 
international rights and obligations.  
Additionally, concerning the status of the NSA’s in the International Law, NSA’s can be 
defined very simply, as the definition of these actors is in their name, – a group of actors 
composed of all actors that are not States. This definition is wide and includes individuals, as 
                                                          
41
 Roland Portmann “Legal Personality in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 10  
42
 Ibidem, p. 10 
43
 Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, ICJ, 1949 
44 Andrea Bianchi “The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State Actors and International Law” in “From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma”, Ulrich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-Erasmus 
Khan, Andreas Paulus, Sabine von Schorlemer, and Christoph Vedder, 2011, pp. 1-21, p. 3 
45
 Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, ICJ, 1949 
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well as the groups of individuals. Boyle’s exemplary list of possible non-state actors illustrates 
a very good point on how miscellaneous the definition of NSA’s is. The author stated that 
“non-state actors today encompass inter alia sub-state entities and denied statehood, national 
and international issued-based NGO’s, individuals, “kitchen-tablers”, the corporate and 
business sector, shareholders, churches and religious groupings, trade unions and employees, 
academics, think tanks, consumer groups, para-military forces, professional associations, 
including those of judges, lawyers, parliamentarians and law enforcement agencies, expert 
communities, sport associations and criminal terrorist associations”.46 Or to put it more 
simply – the NSA’s are the actors that do not possess the authority and the power of the State 
and its organs.
47
 Although, today, NSA’s are increasingly being treated as possibly bearing 
some international rights and duties as States and other recognized subjects of International 
Law. 
However, NSA’s are still not considered to be subjects, but objects of the International 
Law.
48
 And yet, this view does not demonstrate the clear position and status that NSA’s have 
nowadays. Of course, it can not also be denied that NSA’s depends greatly on the States and 
their law-making powers, such as recognition of a new subject of the International Law. 
The other reason why NSA’s are treated as objects of the International Law lies in their 
own negative term – non-state actors. Philip Alston calls this “The “Not-A-Cat” syndrome” 
and states that this kind of negative term “do not stem from language inadequacies but instead 
have been internationally adopted in order to reinforce the assumption that the state is not 
only the central actor, but also the indispensable and pivotal one around which all other 
entities revolve”49 and this means that other entities in the International Law can “only be 
identified in terms of their relationship to the State”.50 According to this author’s view, 
subjects in the international legal system are then divided in two categories: states and not-
states. This, again, means that other entities can become subjects of the International Law and 
                                                          
46
 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin “The Making of International Law”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007, p. 44 
47
 Neomi Gal-Or “Observations on the Desirability of an Enhanced International Legal Status of the Non-State 
Actor” in “Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law. From Law-Takers to Law-Makers”, ed. Math 
Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, Ashgate, Farnham, 2010, pp. 125-149, p. 130 
48
 Janne E. Nijman “Non-State Actors and the International Rule of Law: Revisiting the “Realist Theory” of 
International Legal Personality” in “Non-State Actor Dynamics in International Law. From Law-Takers to  
Law-Makers”, ed. Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, Ashgate, Farnham, 2010, pp. 91-124, p. 93 
49
 Philip Alston “Non-State Actors and Human Rights”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 3 
50
 Ibidem, p. 4 
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gain ILP, but, with the prevailing traditional view to what are (or should be) the subjects of the 
International Law, those other entities would need to look very similar to the States in order to 
meet the requirements of ILP
51
 (to be capable of possessing international rights and duties, and 
bringing international claims). In addition, this is true concerning the status of the NSA’s in 
the international legal system. States are looking skeptical to a possibility to recognize NSA’s 
as the subjects having ILP, as well as there are no clear international legal documents that 
would define straight the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the NSA’s and their role in 
the international plane on the whole (e.g. there is no convention on the law of ILP or NSA’s). 
For this reason, the status of the NSA’s in the International Law is vague, although non-state 
actors do participate in and do have an impact on the international legal processes and, 
therefore, NSA’s should be presumed to have a duty to conform with international legal 
obligations, especially what regards the protection of the fundamental human rights.
52
 On the 
whole, the emphasis should be put more not on the notion of “subject” or “ILP”, but on the 
obligations and direct responsibility of the NSA’s for the violations of the International Law 
norms. In other words, if there is an acknowledgement that NSA’s do actually participate in 
the international legal system, there should also be international legal norms that would clearly 
indicate their role in the international legal process as there are norms that define the role and 
obligations, as well as responsibility of the States (e.g. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts) and other international subjects (e.g. Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organizations ).
53
 Of course, this may cause several 
problems: firstly, there can be reduced level of responsibility of the State to ensure compliance 
of other actors with international obligations, and, secondly, direct applicability of the 
responsibility to the NSA’s for the violations of the international norms might not be as 
powerful as direct responsibility of the States, yet, the respect of the international norms that 
are a fundamental value to the whole international community and responsibility for the 
violation of such norms should be owed by all actors, regardless of whether they are States or 
NSA’s. For this purpose, NSA’s as being capable to participate in the international legal 
process they should also have a right to such participation and the responsibility of their own 
actions.  
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Eventually, it can be said that: 
1. Growing influence of the NSA’s in the international legal process raises the 
need of redefining the boundaries of the international legal system concerning 
the ability to participate in the international plane for the other entities, such as 
NSA’s, because the International Law can no longer be so static and state-
centric in the XXI century; 
2. The vague status of the NSA’s leads to the conclusion that the traditional 
subjects doctrine is no longer able to provide a satisfactory account of the social 
realities underlying the International Law; 
3. There is the need to rethink and refresh the fundamental tenets of the 
international law theory, including the doctrine of subjects, and to put more 
efforts on the development of the direct rights, duties and responsibilities of 
NSA’s that the States would no longer be the only ones responsible for the 

























2. Chapter II: Human Rights Law applicability to the non-state actors 
 
2.1. Creating rights and obligations for the non-state actors: 
 
As it was argued in the first chapter, the non-state actors should be recognized as a 
general category of an actor (participant) of the International Law to which a basic set of 
international rights and obligations applies. Moreover, it should be also recognized that 
granting the status of international legal personality to the NSA’s has an impact on the 
development of the International Law rules and standards, as well as an impact on the 
implementation and more importantly on the compliance with international rule of law by the 
NSA’s, which is highly important to the whole international community. Nevertheless, the 
role of the NSA’s in the process of the creation of the International Law norms is contentious. 
On the one hand, International Law is no longer seen as regulating international rights and 
duties only among States. On the other hand, the traditional subject doctrine still prevails and 
the International Law is still more state-centric than open to the view that other actors, such as 
NSA’s, are having more and more influence on the international community. Therefore, this 
chapter discusses, firstly, the creation of international rights and obligations of the NSA’s, 
secondly, the participation of NSA’s in the creation of such rights and duties, as well as 
possible advantages and disadvantages of such participation, and finally, what obligations the 
NSA’s have under Human Rights Law. 
To begin with, there is a general acknowledgement that there must be consent of the 
subject in order to create certain rights and obligations for that subject. In other words, being 
international legal personality means not only that a subject has certain international rights and 
obligations, but also that that this subject has those rights and obligations to the extent that it 
has given its consent to enjoy those rights and be bound by those duties. However, duties 
under International Law for the NSA’s are still being created without NSA’s consent. Of 
course, what regards protecting the basic values of the international community and what 
regards jus cogens norms, there is no need of consent of the subject in such situations, i.e. to 
the extent that certain international norms could be considered as the most basic values of the 





 But still, on the one hand, the question rises: can the rules be treated as legitimate, if 
they are imposed to the subjects without their consent? On the other hand, could such 
participation of the NSA’s in the law-creation process mean that NSA’s should be treated alike 
to the States, concerning the possession of and bounds of international rights and duties? Also, 
if it would be acknowledged that NSA’s actually play an important role in the international 
law-making process, should then NSA’s be treated as law-makers or law-takers, or maybe 
law-consumers? 
The determination of the precise role of NSA’s in the international law-making process 
is problematic. That is, NSA’s, especially ANSA’s, are being required to comply with 
international norms, while NSA’s are not included in establishment of such norms, although 
their (NSA’s) role in the implementation of those norms is considered to be very important. 
The other problem, that aggravates the acknowledgement of NSA’s role in the law-making 
process, is that NSA’s are neither States (with direct law-making powers) nor entities that are 
created and empowered by the States (with delegated law-making powers).
55
  
Robert McCorquodale argues that a subject of the International Law can be considered 
to be the one that has direct rights and duties (as well as responsibilities) under international 
legal system, can bring international claims and “[…] is able to participate in the creation, 
development, and enforcement of international law”.56 This view suggests NSA’s (including 
ANSA’s) having the law-making role alongside States in the international legal system. In 
other words, NSA’s as having certain international rights and duties are also considered to be 
participants in law-making process, because rights and especially obligations can not be 
imposed on the subject without that subject’s awareness. This means that in order for the 
NSA’s to be governed by the international legal norms, NSA’s should have an opportunity of 
participation in the making of such norms. Though, such NSA’s participation is problematic, 
especially regarding the creation of HRL norms. 
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By signing and ratifying human rights treaties States usually create state-to-state duties. 
Those duties are to protect, respect and fulfil human rights. Furthermore, States under human 
rights treaties acknowledge and guarantee human rights to individuals (that are NSA’s) and at 
the same time maintain and secure those rights from violations by another States. Meanwhile, 
NSA’s have a right to have those rights that are guaranteed by the State. This means that 
international human rights treaties do not create rights to NSA’s under international legal 
system, but rather create obligations for the State parties to secure and develop human rights. 
However, this does not mean that, as a result, NSA’s do not have possibility to participate in 
the development of human rights norms. Human right treaties and conventions include 
procedural rights for the NSA’s (for example, the right to petition) and by granting such 
procedural rights to the NSA’s States recognize the importance of the NSA’s role in the 
international legal system and most importantly by granting those procedural rights States 
have: firstly, created international rights for NSA’s and secondly, an international legal 
personality of NSA’s.57 In other words, by granting ILP for NSA’s, NSA’s not only have been 
given international rights and obligations, but also the possibility to have an import role in the 
law-making process of international legal norms by which NSA’s like States are bound and 
should give consent to be bound by those norms. 
Additionally, if States create international obligations for the NSA’s without their 
consent, the legitimacy of those obligations becomes controversial.
58
 Therefore, in order to 
ground the binding character of the International Law for NSA’s, there must be proved that 
either: firstly, the process of creation of such international duties is just (i.e. implies that the 
NSA’s have at least at some extent participated in the creation of those international norms) or 
secondly, the legal norm or its implementation has in itself an important value for the 
international community
59
 and this creates the duty for NSA’s to uphold that value. In the 
same vein, the members of the international community have the right to demand from the 
NSA’s to act in the same way regarding the protection of fundamental values of the 
international legal system as the rest subjects of the International Law. Additionally, the 
demand of protecting international values makes NSA’s a part of the international community, 
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as well as a part of the international legal norms creation process. In other words, by having a 
duty and being affected by that duty, NSA’s should be allowed to participate in the 
development of such duty and to influence the content of the norm from which that duty rises. 




NSA’s, depending on their status (for example, ANSA’s), could be given the possibility 
to participate in the international law-making process in certain ways. For example: 
1. The bilateral agreements between States and NSA’s; 
2. NSA’s having control over territory in the State; 
3. NSA’s as bearers of the international rights and duties; 
4. Through the international treaties that are signed and ratified by the States; 
5. Through the basic values of the international community. 
 1.1. One way of NSA’s involvement in the law-making process could be when the 
States enter into bilateral agreements with the NSA’s. Such agreements could also be made 
with armed groups during non-international armed conflicts. Although this kind of 
involvement would still depend more on State’s consent to grant NSA a role in negotiations on 
certain commitments that rise from the agreement, the main point would be that NSA’s would 
be given a possibility to participate in legal norms creation to that extent that they (NSA’s) 
have entered into the international agreement and, as a result, are bound by that agreement. In 
other words, legal norms of such bilateral agreements would be treated as legitimate, because 
NSA’s had a possibility to participate in the creation of those norms from which certain 
international obligations for NSA’s rises. In addition, by this it would be acknowledged that 
NSA’s has a role (although limited) in the development of the international legal system. 
2.2. NSA’s that have control over the State’s territory (or part of the territory) or/and 
exercise governmental functions could also be seen as having role in the law-creation process. 
That is, such NSA’s (like States) enter into legal agreement with the States, as well as other 
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NSA’s and by doing that such NSA’s participates in the development of the international legal 
system. Furthermore, States have signed peace agreements with NSA’s (i.e. ANSA’s) that 
exercise control over the territory. Such ANSA’s have also signed agreements with each other. 
Therefore, considering that these kind of agreements are often characterized as treaties
61
, it 
can be said that NSA’s do participate in the creation of the international legal norms. 
3.3. NSA’s as ILP have certain rights and obligations under the International Law. The 
creation of rights for such actors needs no justification, however, imposition of international 
duties that have direct effect to NSA’s need to be made with the awareness of such actors. 
That is, NSA’s should have a possibility to participate in the law-creation process at least what 
regards the international obligations that are (or may become) binding on NSA’s. Otherwise, 
such norms that impose direct duties on NSA’s without their consent would be illegitimate. 
4.4. Although international treaties are usually signed between the States and those 
treaties usually create state-to-state obligations, the norms of the international treaties also 
have affect on the other international community members, as well as on the NSA’s. 
Additionally, international treaties, particularly international human rights treaties, do not 
impose direct obligations on the NSA’s. On the contrary, human rights treaties impose direct 
international duties on the States that are parties to those treaties. Yet, international human 
rights treaty’s norms are implemented through the State’s national legal system. In other 
words, while international treaties impose only indirect international duties on the NSA’s and 
direct international duties on the States, NSA’s are affected when the norms of those 
international human rights treaties are being implemented at the national legal level. This 
means that, when there is a slight possibility for the NSA’s to be involved in HRL norms 
creation at the international level (especially for the ANSA’s), NSA’s should be involved in 
the implementation of such norms at the national level, because those norms have the direct 
impact on the NSA’s within the territory of the State that is a party to the particular 
international human rights treaty, which norms are followed in the State. Therefore, the 
ignorance of the possible role of NSA’s in the implementation of HRL norms at the national 
level may raise the question of the legitimacy of direct imposition of such norms on NSA’s.  
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5.5. All the international norms, standards and values should be developed considering 
the needs of the whole international community. NSA’s are the members of the international 
community just like States, international organizations and etc. For this purpose, NSA’s 
should be involved in the international law-making process as other subjects of the 
International Law are. NSA’s actions and decisions have an effect on the development and the 
implementation of the international legal norms, as well as the protection of the basic 
international values. By the acknowledgement of such important role of the NSA’s in the 
international legal system, international duties should not be imposed on such international 
actors without their consent. In other words, there should not be a demand for NSA’s to obey 
international norms and to protect international values, when NSA’s have not been given a 
possibility to have the influence on the creation of such norms and values. 
Regarding what have been mention before, there could be a lot off ways, how to involve 
NSA’s in the international law-making process, but the rationale of such involvement is based 
not only on the importance of the bestowal of participatory right in such law-making process, 
but on the effectiveness of the regulation and the responsibility (accountability) of the 
international community member in case of the violation of the international norms, especially 
human rights norms. For this reason, there could be possible advantages and disadvantages of 
the involvement of the NSA’s in the international law-making process. 
Considering the advantages of the possibility for NSA’s to participate in the creation of 
the international legal system, it can be said that: 
1. First of all, the participatory rights of the NSA’s in the international law-making 
process mean that NSA’s can be held responsible for the trespass of the 
international obligations, in which creation they have been participating. 
Moreover, regarding the fact that most NSA’s, especially ANSA’s, do not 
consider themselves bound by particular international rules usually because they 
(NSA’s) did not participate in the creation of such rules, it can be said that 
granting participatory rights to NSA’s (including ANSA’s, because precisely 
these  
non-state actors cause the most problems, concerning the compliance with 
international norms and standards) would strengthen and increase the 
compliance with international rules by NSA’s. Indeed, the involvement in the 
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law-creation process promotes a sense of “ownership” over the norms.62 That is, 
when NSA’s are being involved in the making of the law, they can be 
considered to have internalized that law
63
 and, as a result, NSA’s could not 
justify their non-compliance with their international duties on the ground of lack 
of legitimacy of the norms that have created those obligations for them. 
Therefore, it can be said that the higher number of various groups interests are 
taken into account, the greater is the chance to limit possible violations of the 
International Law norms, especially considering the development and the 
protection of the fundamental human rights and the needs of the international 
community on the whole. 
2. The next possible advantage is relevant to armed non-state actors. The main 
intention is that allowing armed groups to give their consent to comply with the 
International Law norms may also have the influence on other armed groups to 
agree to comply with such norms.
64
 This kind of influence can also have an 
impact on the increase of the protection of the civilians during armed conflicts, 
as well as the protection of the fundamental human rights on the whole. 
3. Regarding ANSA’s, if they were given possibility to take part in the 
development of the international rules, especially those governing armed 
hostilities, it would be much harder for the States to consider themselves free of 
any obligation and consequently to apply the most violent measures of 
repression on ANSA’s.65  
4. The involvement of the NSA’s in the law-making process at the international 
level has significance in the growth of the preservation of human rights. In other 
words, by being able to participate in the International Human Rights Law 
norms creation and by giving consent to be bound by those norms, NSA’s at the 
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same time accept the duty to respect human dignity. Moreover, the need of 
higher protection of human rights may be increased with the number of 
commitments that NSA’s would take during the participation in the international 
legal norms development. 
5. Involving NSA’s in the law-creation process would make sure the legitimacy of 
the norms that create direct international obligations for the NSA’s. 
Notwithstanding all these possible advantages that involvement of the NSA’s in the  
international law-making process can have, the Sates still see some disadvantages that such 
participatory rights of NSA’s can have. Such State’s doubts are usually based on several 
concerns. The States assume that permitting such participation would:
66
 
1. Affect NSA’s legal status. That is, the States treat the inclusion of the NSA’s in 
the international law-making highly controversially. The States indicate that such 
participatory rights would grant NSA’s status that would let them be in a position 
on a part with the States, i.e. by granting NSA’s a law-making role in the 
international legal level would make NSA’s “state-like” entities. Furthermore, 
this concern is bigger regarding the role of ANSA’s in the law-creation process. 
The States note that acknowledgement of participatory rights of armed non-state 
actors in the international law-making process would also mean that the States 
would acknowledge that, for example, terrorists are equal to the States, 
especially, if such actors have control over the territory or exercise government-
like powers. However, granting NSA’s (including armed groups) a role in the 
law-making process does not mean that they will have the same status as the 
States. Indeed, recognizing that different entities can be the subjects of the 
International Law does not make them identical to the States, because the 
subjects of law “[…] in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their 
nature or in the extent of their rights […]”.67 Therefore, the participation of the 
NSA’s in the international law-making should be treated not as the NSA’s are 
being granted the same status as the States, but as the positive action, when all 
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interests of all the entities that have certain international rights and obligations 
are taken into account and that all entities on which the States pose duties are 
well represented under the international legal level.  
2. Lead to the downgrading of the International Law norms. This concern is closely 
linked to the first one that participatory rights in the law-making process would 
grant for the NSA’s (including armed groups) State alike status. On the contrary, 
by giving NSA’s the possibility to participate in the international law-making 
process does not mean that NSA’s are being given an equal role to that of the 
States in such process. Moreover, NSA’s are not given a possibility to displace or 
limit their international obligations. Instead, NSA’s are given a legal chance to 
be well represented and to give their consent regarding the norms that create 
direct international duties to them. Therefore, this is the main reason, why NSA’s 
should be involved in the law-creation, because NSA’s actions like actions of 
any other subject of the International Law have an impact on the international 
legal system as a whole. 
Up to this point, it can be said that these indicated possible disadvantages of the 
participation of the NSA’s in the international law-making process reflect more self-interest of 
the States rather than the interest of the whole international community. That is, the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of giving NSA’s a role in the law-making must be weighed 
against each other and should be judged by reference to the needs of the international 
community.
68
 For this purpose, the States should consider the possible participation of the 
NSA’s in the law-making process under international legal system. Furthermore, the States 
should also relinquish the idea of the traditional subject doctrine that only States can claim to 
be subjects of the International Law, because NSA’s are simply not State. Therefore, if the 
States ignore NSA’s it does not mean that they (NSA’s) will just “disappear”.69  
Indeed, such ignorance of the NSA’s by the States only aggravates the possibility for the 
NSA’s to be a part of the international community and to give their consent to be bound by 
certain international legal norms, as well as to comply to such norms. As a result, NSA’s 
                                                          
68
 Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran “Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the 
Creation of International Humanitarian Law”, The Yale Journal of International Law / Vol. 37/ Issue 01/ 2011, 
pp. 107-152, p. 140 
69
 Sophie Rondeau “Participation of armed groups in the development of the law applicable to armed conflicts”, 
International Review of the Red Cross / Vol. 93 / No. 883 / 2011, pp. 649-672, p. 650 
25 
 
usually accept international obligations, if they have something to gain from this acceptance 
and, at the same time, NSA’s are usually willing to participate in the law-creation, if such 
participation will have benefits for them.
70
 Such situation, when the States are simply ignoring 
NSA’s and when NSA’s are simply looking for certain benefits from participation in the 
international legal system, is not well promising for the whole international community. It is 
important to emphasize that the creation and development of the international legal system 
rests with all members of the international community. In the same vein, the participation of 
the NSA’s in the international norm creation depends not only on their will to participate in 
such process, but it also depends on the other actors in the law-making. For this reason, all 
members of the international community, including NSA’s (and ANSA’s) should accept each 
other’s legal positions and interests in order for the law-creation process to be successful. 
Regarding what have been mentioned before, it can be said that the international  
law-making and law-enforcement process have become multi-layered
71
 and the number of 
actors involved has increased greatly. Moreover, NSA’s have also demonstrated that their 
interests and actions, as well as decisions have the influence on the international law-creation 
process and that NSA’s role, on the whole, in the international legal system is important and 
can not be ignored. However, this kind of NSA’s influence on the international legal norms 
development does neither grant them the status of the international law-makers nor endow 
them law-making powers. That is, notwithstanding NSA’s influence, the States remain the 
exclusive international law-makers.
72
 Of course, NSA’s can have certain importance in the 
creation of the new legal norms and the other participants of the international legal system 
have to pay attention to NSA’s interests, especially when putting international obligations on 
them. For this reason, NSA’s instead of being treated as law-makers (because the States do not 
agree on this kind of view and the participation of the NSA’s in the law-making process see 
highly controversial, because of the possibility that NSA’s would became state-like entities, 
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although there are no reasons for such doubts as it was argued in the text before), they should 
be rather seen as the law-takers or the law-consumers. 
   It is important to explain that the definitions “the law-taker” and “the law-consumer” 
are seen from different perspectives in this master thesis. The definition “law-taker” is 
narrower than the definition “law-consumer”.73 That is, the term “law-taker” is seen as NSA’s 
would only accept norms that create international obligations for them and only obey such 
norms without any other importance in the international legal system, i.e. NSA’s are given 
certain rights and duties and they simply enjoy those rights and comply with those duties. For 
this purpose, NSA’s should be treated as the international law-consumers seeing the word 
“consumer” from that perspective that the consumers not only take what they are given (in this 
context that would be certain international obligations), but also have the importance in the 
production of those goods that they are being given. In other words, NSA’s not only have 
certain international rights and obligations, but also play an important role in the creation and 
the development of those rights and obligations, as well as for the legitimacy of norms from 
which those rights and duties rise. 
Additionally, although the law-making status of the NSA’s is limited, they should be 
given the possibility to know international regulatory instruments in order to be well 
represented in the international legal system. Moreover, regarding the fact that the NSA’s 
actions and decisions have the influence on the States policy and practice, the States should 
not ignore NSA’s role in the international law-creation process. Therefore, since NSA’s, as the 
law-consumers, have an impact on the interests of the whole international community, their 
complicity in the international norm creation process should preeminently be treated as  
policy-making and not as the law.
74
 
  Up to this point, it can be said that: 
1. Non-state actors do matter in the international legal system. That is, NSA’s play 
an increasingly eminent role in the international law-making process and the 
decisions, which are made during that process, affect and create international 
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duties for the NSA’s. Therefore, the States can no longer ignore (or deny) the 
importance that NSA’s have to the international community. 
2. It is important to include NSA’s in the international legal norms creation process 
in order for those norms to be legitimate, especially when such norms create 
certain international duties for the NSA’s. 




     
2.2. The obligations of the non-state actors under Human Rights Law: 
 
There are a wide variety of activities and actions committed by the non-state actors that 
have a severe effect on human rights. This shows that NSA’s play an important role in 
maintenance and protection of fundamental human rights. Moreover, NSA’s can either protect 
or violate human rights and fundamental values that are acknowledged by the whole 
international community. Although this may be true, only State parties to human rights treaties 
have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil (promote) the human rights of individuals (who 
are NSA’s) within their jurisdiction. This means that human rights treaties are signed and 
ratified between States that have the obligation to maintain and guarantee human rights, while 
individuals (NSA’s) have rights that are only conferred and guaranteed by the States, i.e. 
international human rights treaties do not create obligations under the International Law for 
NSA’s. Furthermore, such nuisance shows that the human rights regime has developed along 
the States and the accountability for the fundamental human rights violations is based on the 
traditional rules of the State responsibility.
76
 However, as it was argued in the text before, the 
state-centric approach is no longer able to provide a satisfactory account of the social realities 
underlying the International Law, especially Human Rights Law. Therefore, the effective 
protection of human rights requires looking beyond the States. That is, monitoring and the 
development of the protective mechanisms should be extended regarding interaction of all 
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members of the international community rather than only within the State’s territory77, 
because all entities have the influence on the protection of human rights, as well as on each 
other’s actions in the international legal system.  
Indeed, from the victims’ perspective the violation of their fundamental human rights is 
an offence against human dignity, whether it is committed by the State or by the NSA’s or by 
any other actor. Regardless, the state-centric approach and the ignorance of the importance of 
the NSA’s role in the international plane leads to the situation, when actions of any other 
entity than the State, despite the severe impact that those actions may have on human rights, 
are not treated as a violation of HRL norms.
78
 This also leads to the conclusion that NSA’s do 
not have any obligations under HRL, because the international human rights treaties create 
obligations only for the States. Notwithstanding, this is not true – NSA’s as any other member 
of the international community have certain international duties under HRL and only state-
centric approach to HRL norms aggravates the applicability of such norms to the NSA’s. 
One of the biggest problems is that the actions of the NSA’s that violate human rights 
are not considered to be a violation of human rights law due to the structure of that law
79
, i.e. 
regarding the fact that HRL norms create obligations only for the States. Indeed, the unlawful 
acts of the NSA’s are usually attributed to the States80 and then those acts become the acts of 
the State, and, as a result, the State becomes responsible for such act and not the NSA. 
Therefore, it can be said that NSA’s are treated like their actions can not violate human rights. 
This leads to another conclusion that such treatment excludes a lot of human rights violations 
from the direct protection of HRL, as well as from the direct applicability to the NSA’s for 
their international human rights law norms violations.  
Additionally, HRL creates for the NSA’s vertical obligations rather than horizontal 
obligations. That is, the States have direct obligations under HRL (horizontal obligations) and 
NSA’s have to obey the norms that the State lets down on them by signing and ratifying 
international human rights treaties (vertical obligations). However, it can be argued that 
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human rights norms operate on three levels – as the rights of individuals, as obligations taken 
by the States, and as legitimate expectations of the international community.
81
 Furthermore, 
human rights are each person’s inherent dignity and such natural rights should be respected 
and protected by everyone. Therefore, although NSA’s may not have legal obligations under 
the international human rights treaties, but they still remain the subject to the demand of the 
international community, all the more because NSA’s participate in the international legal 
system by making influence on the creation of the international legal norms, as well as on 
HRL norms. 
Also, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) indicates that 
every organ of society respects and promotes human rights.
82
 Indeed, two passages of the 
Universal Declaration are cited as a proof that this declaration creates human rights 
obligations for the NSA’s.83 That is, the Universal Declaration preamble’s paragraph 8, which 
states that “[…] every individual and every organ of society […] shall […] promote respect 
for these [human] rights and freedoms […]” and Article 29 (1) that “Everyone has duties to 
the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible”. 
Actually, although the word “State” or “State party” do no appear in these provision (as well 
as in the Universal Declaration on the whole), it does not yet mean that the Universal 
Declaration has created direct obligation for the NSA’s regarding human rights.84 That is, 
these provisions should not be interpreted as imposing direct obligations on the NSA’s to 
refrain from committing acts that would be treated as violations of human rights, on the 
contrary, it is more a duty to promote respect for the fundamental human rights and to secure 
their observance. 
85
 However, it cannot also be said that the Universal Declaration is without 
significance concerning the protection and promotion of human rights by the NSA’s. Article 1 
of this declaration indicates that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
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spirit of brotherhood”. This provision creates general obligation for all the members of the 
international community to respect, secure and promote the fundamental human rights. 
Therefore, NSA’s do have certain obligations under HRL. 
Of course, limiting human rights obligations only to the States would not satisfy the 
object and purpose of human rights. In other words, HRL aim is to protect individuals and 
groups from oppressive power primarily in the context of the communities within which they 
live and that oppressive power can come from any source – it could be the State or the NSA’s 
– and can be not only political power, but also economical, social or any other type of power.86 
For this reason, the Security Council has called upon various groups that States do not 
recognize as having the capacity to formally assume international obligations to respect human 
rights.
87
 Additionally, there is more obscurity about implying HRL obligations to the ANSA’s.  
And yet, international human rights principles are increasingly considered to be 
applicable to the armed non-state actors. Indeed, if ANSA’s can have obligations under IHL, 
they should also be able to have obligations under HRL. For example, the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child indicates that armed groups, which are not armed 
forces of a State, “should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons 
under the age of 18 years”.88 Yet, the article does not create a strict obligation for the 
ANSA’s, i.e. the article instead of strict language uses the word “should”. Although, this still 
indicates that ANSA’s have certain human rights obligations. Besides, the distinguished expert 
body the Institute of International Law at its resolution stated that ANSA’s, irrespective of 
their legal status, have the obligation to respect not only IHL, but fundamental human rights as 
well.
89
 Moreover, Article X of the mentioned resolution also indicates that, if certain internal 
disturbances and tensions are not covered by IHL, “[…] individuals remain under the 
protection of international law guaranteeing fundamental human rights” and “all parties are 
bound to respect fundamental rights under the scrutiny of the international community”.90 
                                                          
86
 Manisuli Ssenyonjo “The Applicability of International Human Rights Law to Non-State Actors: What 
Relevance to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights?” in “Human Rights and Non-State Actors”, ed. by Andrew 
Clapham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013, pp. 154-190 , p. 169 
87
 For example, the Security Council Resolutions 1193, 1214, 1216, 1471, 1479, 1509 and etc.   
88
 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 4(1), enacted 2000-05-25 
89
 The Institute of International Law ‘‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law and Fundamental 
Human Rights, in Armed Conflicts in which Non-State Entities are Parties’’, resolution adopted at the Berlin 
Session, 25 August1999, Article II 
90
 Ibidem, Article X 
31 
 
Therefore, it can be said that, although HRL does not lay direct duties on the ANSA’s, the 
main purpose of the International Law to maintain peace and security within the international 
community rises obligations for ANSA’s under HRL, at least at the minimum level, regarding 
the fact that every human being has fundamental human rights guaranteed and protected in 
both levels – international and national.  
Considering what has been mentioned before, it is apparent that the international 
obligations of ANSA’s (and NSA’s on the whole) are limited to the duty to respect elementary 
norms of humanity. In other words, there is no doubt that non-sate actors are prohibited from 
killing, torturing and otherwise inflicting inhumane treatment. Moreover, NSA’s like any other 
member of the international community have the general obligation to maintain peace and 
security within such community. Therefore, it can be said that one cannot have rights without 
duties. 
Although this may be true, international norms, including HRL norms, applicable to 
ANSA’s are formulated more as prohibitions.91 That is, international bodies have accepted the 
applicability of a wide range of international norms to ANSA’s, but they have rarely indicated 
which measures these groups must take in order to be in compliance with these norms.
92
 It was 
more concentrated on what NSA’s should not do rather than how and what measures NSA’s 
should (or must) take in order to be able to implement their international duties in the 
international legal system. For this purpose, NSA’s are left only with general obligations 
under HRL and without clear status from the point of view of international legal norms.  
In short: 
1. NSA’s have human rights obligations (at least general international duties like 
the rest of the international community has, for example, the obligation to protect 
the right to life, the right to health, the right of freedom of movement and etc.), 
however, HRL does not impose direct obligations on the non-state actors. States 
are still considered to be the main bearers of obligations to respect, to protect and 
to fulfil fundamental human rights. Although, such view do not satisfy the object 
and purpose of human rights. 
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2. Regarding the fact that, in order for the States to implement the main obligations 
they have under HRL (to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights), the States 
must take certain measures and to make sure that other members of the 
international community, including NSA’s, respect and do not violate human 
rights, leads to the conclusion that NSA’s may violate human rights and at the 
same time this means that NSA’s do have certain international obligations under 
HRL. 
3. NSA’s have to respect States’ human rights obligations and to refrain from acts 
or omissions that violate human rights.    
4. ANSA’s should be equally obliged to respect and do not violate human rights, 
because they have an impact on the protection and development of fundamental 






















3. The responsibility of the non-state actors under Human Rights Law 
 
3.1. The possibility of the direct responsibility of the non-state actors for the human 
rights violations: 
 
Responsibility of the non-state actors under International Human Rights Law is one of 
the most critical challenges facing international legal system today. According to the 
traditional theory of subjects, the International law is said to be primarily concerned with the 
rules of the State behavior and these standards, which include fundamental human rights, can 
only be violated by the State officials, therefore, the violations committed by the private actors 
fall within the purview of the ordinary national law.
93
 In other words, under traditional 
approaches to human rights, non-state actors are beyond the direct reach of the International 
Human Rights Law.
94
 They cannot be parties to the relevant treaties and so they are only 
bound to the extent that obligations accepted by the States can be applied to them by the 
governments. The result is that NSA’s are generally considered not to be bound directly by 
Human Rights Law.
95
 And yet, does this mean that NSA’s can ignore human rights as long as 
the governments do not hold them accountable? The answer should be negative.   
Although HRL do not impose direct obligations on the non-state actors, they do have 
duties regarding the protection and the maintenance of the fundamental human rights, which is 
the concern of the whole international community. That is, all the members of the international 
community have legitimate expectations of each other to protect and develop human rights. 
Moreover, everyone has a general obligation not to violate human rights and at the same time 
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms […] without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status”.96 For this purpose, NSA’s not only have obligations under 
HRL, but also they have responsibility for violations of HRL norms. In other words, everyone, 
including NSA’s, has the obligation to respect and not to violate fundamental human rights. 
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Of course, duty usually goes hand in hand with the responsibility. Responsibility is 
something that one has to do as a duty, which must be fulfilled and which has a consequent 
penalty for failure.
97
 That is, the violation of the fundamental human rights or the failure to 
prevent such violation raises responsibility under HRL. Nevertheless, more problems, 
regarding the accountability under HRL, occur with ANSA’s.   Additionally, the International 
Court of Justice has indicated that International Human Rights Law also applies in situations 
of armed conflicts, whether international or of a non-international character.
98
 This means that 
ANSA’s must comply not only with IHL norms, but with HRL norms as well. 
Moreover, even though it is difficult to establish direct legal human rights obligations of 
ANSA’s, there is a broader agreement that armed groups could be bound by HRL when they 
exercise element of governmental functions and have de facto authority over a population.
99
 
This will normally be the case when an armed group controls a certain portion of the 
territory.
100
 The need to regulate the relationship between those who govern and those who are 
governed would justify the application of that body of law.
101
 In other words, contrary to IHL, 
which rules require armed groups to respect certain norms in their position as a military 
authority, HRL demands from ANSA’s that they operate as a responsible political authority 
governing territory and population.
102
 Therefore, in such situation, there would be a possibility 
of direct responsibility of ANSA’s for violations of HRL norms. 
Furthermore, Article 10 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility indicates that “the 
conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new government of a State shall be 
considered an act of that State under international law”. Also, Human Rights Committee 
stated that “[…] once the people are accorded the protection of the rights […] such protection 
devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in 
government of the State party, including dismemberment in more than one State or State  
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succession […]”.103 Therefore, it can be said that human rights obligations bind the 
territory
104, i.e. ANSA’s that control territory (or the certain part of the territory) are bind by 
the human rights obligations that are taken and are running in that territory, because ANSA’s 
at this point are treated as authority governing territory and population, and the need to ensure 
the safety and protection of the population still holds true.  
However, some problems arise regarding this theory: 
1. First of all, there is no clear legal source indicating, what level of “authority” or 
“control” over a population is required in order to impose human rights 
obligations on ANSA’s.105 Furthermore, ANSA’s usually exist only temporary 
and, therefore, they do not become a new authority (or government) and, at the 
same time, for this reason ANSA’s legal personality is of the limited nature106, 
i.e. ANSA’s are either suppressed by the State, or they seize power and establish 
themselves as the new government, or they secede and join another State, or 
create a new State, and, for this purpose, it can be said that ANSA’s cannot 
possess rights based on the permanent nature of international actors.
107
 This 
means that ANSA’s only exercise de facto authority over the territory and the 
population. This kind of “authority” aggravates the possibility to hold ANSA’s 
directly responsible for the human rights violations, because ANSA’s lacking 
effective power are unlikely to be able to comply with the human rights norms, 
since they lack the minimum infrastructure required for their implementation.
108
 
2. Next, the States do not wish to attribute government-like qualities to NSA’s, 
especially to ANSA’s. The States argue that recognizing international legal 
personality of ANSA’s would also mean recognizing the existence of another 
authority within the State’s territory. For example, pro-Russian separatists that 
are now acting in the eastern Ukraine have established two separate from 
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Ukraine republics: the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. However, 
neither these separatists nor their established republics are internationally 
recognized. Additionally, separatists have also arranged elections, in order to 
choose their chief executives and parliaments.
109
 Once again, neither 
the European Union nor the United States of America have recognized the 
elections (which violate the terms of the Minsk Protocol, according to which 
local elections in the areas occupied by the separatists were supposed to be held 
on 7 December, in accordance with Ukrainian law).
110
 Therefore, this example 
shows that the States are not willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
ANSA’s authority over the part(s) of the territory, as well as that ANSA’s are 
operating in ways which are akin to governments. Therefore, this leads to the 
conclusion that ANSA’s are incapable of protecting human rights, regarding the 




3. Another difficulty is that there are no judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms 
specifically competent to examine claims against armed opposition groups.
112
 In 
the same vein, the situation on who has standing to bring a claim, and, who is 
entitled to represent armed opposition groups in a claim or at arbitration is vague 
as well. For this reason, it would be difficult to hold ANSA’s directly 
responsible for the violations of the fundamental human rights during their 
unlawful activities. 
Nevertheless, despite these problems, ANSA’s could still be legally bound by core human 
rights norms whether or not there is control over a certain territory or a level of a de facto 
authority over a population.
113
 In other words, although ANSA’s do not incur direct human 
rights obligations under HRL, ANSA’s would still be bound by jus cogens norms. Indeed, 
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there is an almost intrinsic relationship between jus cogens and human rights.
114
 For this 
reason, it can be said that peremptory human rights norms could be treated as projections of 
the individual and collective conscience, i.e. human rights norms materialize as a powerful 
collective belief of the whole international community.
115
 That is, jus cogens norms reflect the 
developing interests of the international community as a whole, not the narrow interests of a 
particular State, therefore, peremptory norms protect the fundamental values of the 
international community.
116
 Furthermore, the relation between jus cogens and human rights 
was developed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa case, where 
the judge indicated that “[…] jus cogens, a kind of imperative law which constitutes the 
contrast to jus dispositivum, capable of being changed by way of agreement between States, 
surely the law concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to belong to the 
jus cogens”.117 Additionally, paragraph 4 (Part I) of the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action states that: “The promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms must be considered as a priority objective […] in accordance with […] international 
cooperation. […] the promotion and protection of all human rights is a legitimate concern of 
the international community”.118 For this purpose, it can be said that jus cogens is the 
reflection of the values within the international community, i.e. these norms are connected to 
the interest and system of values of the whole international community. 
Moreover, even though it has not been settled, which human rights norms are part of jus 
cogens norms, the International Law Commission has indicated that peremptory norms, which 
are clearly accepted and recognized by all the international community, include “[…] the 
prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity 
and torture, and the right to self-determination”.119 Further, The United Nations Human 
Rights Committee has also identified the following acts that would violate jus cogens norms: 
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arbitrary deprivations of life, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, taking hostages, 
imposing collective punishments, arbitrary deprivations of liberty, and deviating from 
fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.
120
 In other words, 
these mentioned acts (although the given list may be revised) violate the most basic human 
rights: the right to life, the right to health and the right to freedom. For this purpose, these 
natural rights should be respected by everyone and every entity – this means including 
ANSA’s as well.121 
Of equal importance, despite legal uncertainties and regarding the fact that ANSA’s 
have an important role in implementing, as well as in violating fundamental human rights, 
there is a need to hold such entities directly responsible for HRL norms violations. Such 
inclusion of ANSA’s in compliance with HRL norms is important, because:122 
1. Civilian population must be protected against the threats posed by ANSA’s in the 
areas beyond the control of the State. 
2. International humanitarian law rules which bound ANSA’s do not always cover 
all the issues during armed conflicts, especially regarding the everyday life of 
people living in areas under the control of ANSA’s, therefore ANSA’s should 
also be bound by HRL norms. 
3. When it comes to the protection of core human rights and dignity, it does not 
matter in the eyes of the victims whether the violation has been committed by the 
state or by a non-state actor. 
Regarding what has been mentioned, it can be said that human rights should be 
respected, protected and developed by the NSA’s as well. Moreover, the respect and 
implementation of the human rights should be seen as the respect of the basic HRL standards 
and principles, rather than just as the violations of binding legal obligations on NSA’s.123 
Nevertheless, the international community has also expressed a need to hold NSA’s 
(especially ANSA’s) accountable for the violations committed against the civilian population, 
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concerning the influential role that NSA’s play in the creation and the development of the 
international legal norms and at the international legal system on the whole.
124
 In other words, 
fundamental human rights should be respected by everyone. Furthermore, the obligations to 
respect, to protect, and to fulfil developed by United Nations human rights treaty bodies for 
the State parties could be used as a valuable conceptual framework for the analysis of the 
extent of the human rights obligations of the NSA’s125 and the possibility of their direct 
responsibility for human rights violations under HRL. 
On the whole, it can be emphasized that: 
1. Although HRL do not impose direct obligations on the non-state actors, they do 
have duties regarding the protection and maintenance of the fundamental human 
rights, which is the concern of the whole international community. That is, the 
influence of the NSA’s on the security of the core rights of every human being is 
too great to ignore it. Therefore, the direct responsibility for the violations of 
human rights should be imposed on the NSA’s (including ANSA’s). 
2. Despite legal uncertainties, ANSA’s that have de facto authority over the 
territory or the population should be bound by HRL norms and be held 
responsible for the failure to respect and secure human rights in the areas under 
their control. 
3. The basic obligations under HRL: the obligation to respect, to protect and to 
fulfil fundamental human rights, should be also implemented by the NSA’s 
(especially ANSA’s that have control over certain part of the territory), in order 
to enhance the compliance with HRL norms by the NSA’s. 
4. As long as the States do not want NSA’s to be directly accountable for the 
fundamental human rights violations, they will not become accountable. When 
the States want NSA’s to become directly responsible for such grave violations, 
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5. The interpretation of the different international human rights standards should 
focus more on the effective protection of the rights of the individuals, rather than 





     3.2. Responsibility of the non-state actors through the State’s obligations under 
Human Rights Law: 
 
As it was argued in the previous subsection, direct accountability of the NSA’s is not yet 
developed under Human Rights Law, as well as under the International Law in general. 
Though, the responsibility (in general) for violations of the fundamental human rights is not 
wholly excluded and the increasing awareness of the whole international community that 
NSA’s should be bound (directly) by human rights obligations is recognized.128 Furthermore, 
even though there are difficulties in establishing direct legal human rights obligations and 
responsibilities of NSA’s, there is still a possibility to hold NSA’s responsible for the 
violations of HRL norms and standards through the State’s obligations under HRL. 
The States distinguish themselves from NSA’s by their power to create and enforce law 
(the exception could be made regarding armed groups exercising element of governmental 
functions and having de facto authority over the territory or the population; such NSA’s could 
be bound by human rights obligations like the States).
129
 In the same vein, what regards HRL, 
it can be said that human rights are those rules, which mediate the relationship between, on the 
one hand, governments or other entities exercising effective power analogous to that of the 
governments and, on the other hand, those who are subjects to that power
130
, i.e. HRL norms 
control the relationship between the governors and the subjects. For this purpose, international 
human rights treaties place an obligation on the State parties to adopt legislation or other 
measures in order to ensure and realize the fundamental human rights indicated in those 
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international human rights treaties.
131
 To put it differently, the States have (general) obligation 




Additionally, it is clear that international human rights treaties are principally addressed 
to the States and that the NSA’s cannot (at least now) be parties to the existing human rights 
treaties.
133
 For this reason and concerning the fact that all the State parties
134
 to the human 
rights treaties have three basic obligations under HRL: to respect, to protect and to fulfil the 
fundamental human rights, the actions of the NSA’s that violate international obligations of 
the State under HRL may be attributed to that State. In other words, Article 2 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility notes that one of the essential conditions for the international 
responsibility of a State is that the conduct in question is attributable to the State under the 
International Law. However, in theory, the conduct of all human beings, corporations or 
collectivities linked to the State by nationality, habitual residence or incorporation might be 
attributed to the State, whether or not they have any connection to the government.
135
 Thus, 
the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that 
of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or 
control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State
136
, or the State may be responsible for the 
effects of the conduct of private parties, if it failed to take necessary measures to prevent those 
effects. Therefore, the International Law Commission in the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility indicated several situations, when the act of the other entity can be (or is) 
treated as an act of the State: 
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State  
(Article 4); 
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2. The conduct of a person or entity which is empowered by the law of that State to 
exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the 
State (Article 5); 
3. The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall 
be considered an act of the former State, if the organ is acting in the exercise of 
elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed 
(Article 6); 
4. The conduct of organs or entities empowered to exercise governmental authority 
is attributable to the State even if it was carried out outside the authority of the 
organ or person concerned or contrary to instructions (Article 7); 
5. The conduct carried out on the instructions of a State organ or under its direction 
or control (Article 8); 
6.  The conduct carried out in the absence or default of the official authorities  
(Article 9); 
7.  The conduct of insurrectional movements, when such movement becomes a new 
government or establishes a new State (Article 10); 
8.  Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own (Article 11). 
It can also be added that the State may become responsible for the human rights violations, if 
there was a complicity in the activity of the NSA’s or the State fails to prevent the unlawful 
acts of the NSA’s137, which leads to the violation of the international obligation of the State 
under HRL. As a result, regarding the fact that the State can be held responsible for the 
unlawful acts committed by the NSA’s and the fact that the State has an obligation to ensure 
protection and security of the fundamental human rights by all the entities within its 
jurisdiction, it can be said that there is a possibility for the NSA’s to be bound by HRL 
through the State’s obligations under this field of law. 
That is, when the State becomes a party to the international human rights treaty and 
ratifies it, the State does so not just on behalf of its own, but also on behalf of all the 
individuals within the State’s territory (the principle of legislative jurisdiction).138 In other 
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words, human rights treaty, which is ratified by the State, also binds NSA’s and the human 
rights obligations indicated in that treaty must be implemented not only by the State party, but 
also by the NSA’s, that are within the jurisdiction of that State, because the rights and duties 
of the State is, at the same time, the rights and duties of the people that create the State.
139
 For 
this purpose, it can be said that, one of the ways to held NSA’s accountable under HRL is by 
incorporating human rights treaty rights and duties into the State’s national legal system, 
which also means that human rights obligations could apply to the NSA’s even in the absence 
of the special legislation.
140
  
The other possible way could be allowing human rights claims against NSA’s within the 
jurisdiction of the State party. However, as it was mentioned in the previous subsection, it 
could be problematic to do this regarding ANSA’s, because there are no judicial or quasi-
judicial mechanisms specifically competent to examine claims against armed opposition 
groups. Nevertheless, in cases not covered by the law in force, the civilians remain under the 
protection of the general principles.
141
 That is, even though ANSA’s are not directly bound by 
HRL, they are bound by IHL rules and general principles, therefore, during the armed conflict 
ANSA’s should comply with such principles as: humanity, distinction, proportionality, 
necessity, as well as the prohibition on the infliction of unnecessary suffering and etc. 
Besides, what also regards ANSA’s, when a government ratifies the international human 
rights treaty, the ratification binds the State and not just the particular ratifying government. 
Therefore, treaties that are already in force also bind incoming governments regardless of their 
status prior to becoming the government.
142
 This means that such treaties as well bind 
ANSA’s that become a new government, even though they (ANSA’s) were previously 
rebelling against the government that has ratified those treaties.
143
 This conclusion is linked to 
the fact that ANSA’s that become a new government from that moment have authority over 
the territory and population, thus, have the obligation to ensure and secure the fundamental 
human rights of that population.  
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 Further, the other possible way to bind ANSA’s, under HRL through the State’s human 
rights obligations could be the bilateral agreements between ANSA’s and the State against 
which it is in armed conflict.
144
 
Eventually, there are certain international human rights treaties (conventions) that create 
rights and obligations upon individuals directly upon their ratification by the State irrespective 
of whether or not such treaties (conventions) have been incorporated into national law. For 
example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide or the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
the human rights obligations indicated in these conventions bind all the State parties and all 
the individuals within their jurisdiction, as well as all the other entities, including NSA’s, and 
all other members of the international community.  
Up to this point, it could be said that: 
1. Regarding the fact that the ratification of the international human rights treaties 
bind not only the State party, but individuals within its territory as well, NSA’s 
could be held responsible for the violations of the fundamental human rights 
through the State’s obligations under Human Rights Law.  
2. Incorporating the international human rights treaties rights and duties into the 
State’s national legal system enhance the compliance with HRL norms by 
NSA’s. 
3. In theory, the conduct of all human beings, corporations or collectivities linked 
to the State by nationality, habitual residence or incorporation might be attributed 
to the State, whether or not they have any connection to the government. 
4. Regarding the fact that the State can be held responsible for the unlawful acts 
committed by the NSA’s it can be said that there is a possibility for the NSA’s to 
be bound by HRL through the State’s obligations under this field of law. 
5. When the State becomes a party to the international human rights treaty and 
ratifies it, the State does so on behalf of all the individuals within the State’s 
territory as well (the principle of legislative jurisdiction). 
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The research made in this Master thesis showed that there is no clear establishment of 
the international legal personality of the non-state actors. That is, there are no clear criteria 
under which international legal personality and the status of NSA’s as subjects of the 
International Law could be determined. Moreover, the obligations and responsibilities of 
NSA’s, especially of ANSA’s, under Human Rights Law are also vague. For this purpose, the 
findings are as follows: firstly, growing influence of the NSA’s in the international legal 
process raises the need of redefining the boundaries of international legal system concerning 
the ability to participate in international plane for the other entities, such as NSA’s. That is, the 
promotion and the protection of the fundamental human rights and freedoms should be the 
goal of all international community.  
Moreover, the traditional subject doctrine is no longer able to provide a satisfactory 
account of the social realities underlying the International Law. For this reason, NSA’s, 
especially ANSA’s, can no longer be ignored in the international legal system. Additionally, it 
is important to include NSA’s in the international legal norms creation process in order for 
those norms to be legitimate, especially when such norms create certain international duties 
for the NSA’s.  
Although Human Rights Law does not impose direct obligations on the non-state actors 
and the States are still considered to be the main bearers of obligations to respect, to protect 
and to fulfil fundamental human rights, the influence of the NSA’s on the creation and 
development of human rights norms is rising greatly.  
Of equal importance, the direct responsibility for the violations of human rights should 
be imposed on the NSA’s (including ANSA’s), regarding NSA’s influence on the protection 
and maintenance of the fundamental human rights. In the same vein, despite legal 
uncertainties, ANSA’s that have de facto authority over the territory or the population should 
be bound by HRL norms and be held responsible for the failure to respect and secure human 
rights in the areas under their control. This is important, because at this point are treated as 
authority governing territory and population, and the need to ensure the safety and protection 
of the population still holds true. 
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Finally, NSA’s could be held responsible for the violations of the fundamental human 
rights through the State’s obligations under Human Rights Law. That is, the ratification of the 
international human rights treaties bind not only the State party, but individuals within its 
territory as well, because human rights obligations are treated as binding the whole territory of 
the State party.  
To sum up, NSA’s (including ANSA’s) do have certain international obligations and 
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